Thursday, September 5, 2024

How Pakistan would have acquired an AWACS two decades before the Indian Air Force

 


It was the period of the 1980s when the United States of America and Pakistan had joined hands to resist the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, by training local militia forces, called the “Mujaheddin”. Pakistani military officials regularly provided logistical support, training, and intelligence to the mujaheddin, and also took part directly in several covert operations to disrupt hostile supply lines and other strategic assets. Along with financial aid provided by Ronald Reagan’s administration in exchange for strengthening the anti-Soviet forces, Islamabad was also promised to be supplied with US-made armament to deal with Kremlin’s aggression against Pakistan. This includes both land and air wing of the Pakistan Armed Forces, which would then expecting sophisticated equipment produced by the Western bloc during the Cold War.

Fighting Falcon Soars while Tigershark falls short

Firstly, the General Dynamics F-16 deal went through in the early 80s. However, the aircraft was expensive and could not be acquired in large numbers, which was sought as per Air Staff Requirements (ASR) laid out by by Pakistan Air Force. The US, looking at an opportunity, pitched the Northrop F-20 “Tigershark”. Tigershark was a low-cost but capable derivative of F-5 fighter aircraft and was specially made for low-budget air forces. The plan was to supplement this platform in place of F-16 due to the fact that “sensitive US technology” must not be shared with non-NATO countries. However, the aircraft did owns certain advantages over the early F-16 models. 

Between 1982 and 1984, the Chief of Air Staff (CAS) of Pakistan Air Force, Air Chief Marshal Anwar Shamim deputed Group Captain Abbas Mirza (who later retired as Air Vice Marshal) to evaluate the F-20 in the USA. He was involved in a series of sorties on the Tigershark but ended up preferring the F-16s after his return to Pakistan. The main reasons cited were that the F-20 weapon control systems were not ready at the time, which created doubts on its combat capabilities, although the performance in terms of agility, and estimated life-cycle costs were fitting for PAF requirements.  Pakistan was useful for Washington to continue its anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan, and hence, it had to agree to supply the F-16 “Fighting Falcon” for the PAF. Despite Northrop's extensive marketing efforts, the F-20 Tigershark never found a buyer among the world's air forces, ultimately leaving the aircraft as an unsold promise.

Pakistan Air Force F-16A (close) and F-16B (far) Block 15. Source: f-16.net

The F-16 turned out successful for Pakistan for air defence missions close to the Pak-Afghan border. The aircraft were quick to launch and intercept Soviet aircraft which were suspected of breaching the Pakistani airspace during their operational sorties. Some missions did see PAF violating the Afghan airspace itself, though returning unharmed as it outguns the Soviet warplanes, like the MiG-23. However, the radar technology of Pakistan was still not upto the mark, due to which there were reportedly 620 occasions of airspace violations by Soviet aircraft in the first nine months of 1986, a wide increase over the 420 such incursions in the previous year.

The Quest for AWACS

Therefore, along with F-16, Pakistan was looking for more options to boost its military capabilities with Western weapon systems, especially since its primary rival India was leading the arms race with the support of the Soviet Union. Among the options, one was for E-3 “sentry” Airborne Early Warning & Control Aircraft (AEW&CS). E-3 would have solved the gaps faced by Pakistan in airspace monitoring, on both the Afghan and Indian fronts. 

An AWACS (Airborne Warning And Control System), or Airborne Early Warning & Control System (AEW&CS), is a specialized aircraft equipped with advanced radar and communication systems. Its main role is to detect and track aircraft, ships, and other objects over long distances, even beyond the horizon. The large radar dome, often seen on top of the plane, can monitor the airspace in all directions.

AWACS are crucial in military operations and referred to as "force multipliers", as they provide a comprehensive picture of the battlefield, helping commanders make informed decisions. They can also coordinate and direct fighter jets, guiding them to their targets or away from threats. Essentially, AWACS acts as the eyes and ears in the sky, ensuring that military forces have a clear understanding of what's happening around them. This is the reasons why they have been a key component of military forces since the introduction.

In 1986, the US Defence Secretary Caspar Willard Weinberger visited Pakistan and met both the then President Zia-ul-Haq and Prime Minster Mohammed Khan Junejo, along with other key officials of Pakistani administration and military. PM Junejo himself announced that Boeing E-3 Sentry emerged as “first choice” for airborne early warning equipment.

E-3 "Sentry". Source: United States Air Force

The original E-3A Sentry, introduced in the US Air Force in 1977 was a groundbreaking airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft that provided significant advancements in air surveillance and battle management. Its radar system offered 360-degree coverage, capable of detecting and tracking aircraft at ranges of up to 320 kilometers, allowing early warning of enemy threats. The E-3A could monitor airspace in real-time, coordinating and directing up to several dozen friendly aircraft during missions, making it a vital asset in maintaining air superiority. However, compared to modern variants, the original E-3A had more limited electronic intelligence and communication capabilities, with less resistance to electronic countermeasures and jamming. It was primarily focused on air defence, providing critical situational awareness to commanders, but lacked some of the multi-role flexibility and advanced data-sharing systems seen in later upgrades. Despite these limitations, the E-3A was a significant leap forward in airborne early warning and control during its time, greatly enhancing NATO and U.S. air operations during the Cold War.

The US yielded to Pakistan’s demands during the Soviet-Afghan war, as mentioned earlier, due to its usefulness in maintaining the anti-Soviet campaign. However, AWACS acquisition is a costly affair. It is an expensive and much more highly regarded platform in terms of US technology. There was also a risk of severe backlash from US opposition as well, which would have accused the government of spending taxpayers’ money on arming foreign nations in a conflict which the US is not even directly involved. Also, looking at the history of the region, there were major concerns regarding the stability in the region due to Indo-Pak relations.

A year later, in 1987, after looking at financial constraints, potential risks and facing the growing impossibility of securing the E-3, Pakistan turned its focus to the Grumman E-2 Hawkeye as a more attainable alternative to meet its airborne early warning needs. The aircraft was integrated with AN/APS-125 radar, offers 360-degree surveillance, and is designed primarily for carrier-based operations, making it highly versatile for naval environments. While the E-3 Sentry offers more extensive command and control capabilities and higher endurance, it comes at a significantly higher cost, typically around $270 million per aircraft, compared to the E-2C's cost of about $200 million. 

E-2 "Hawkeye". Source: military.com

Shifting Alliances and Unfulfilled Promises

The negotiations continued until 1989 in several phases. However, it started getting complicated because Soviet forces had started retreating from Afghanistan after their continuous efforts to gain control had failed, for which the credit goes to eh joint efforts of Islamabad and Washington. But now, Pakistan was not regarded as a crucial ally for the Reagan administration anymore. 

Also, General Zia-ul-Haq, who was a key ally of the U.S. in the Afghan-Soviet War, died in a plane crash in August 1988. Coincidentally, his death occurred hours after he witnessed a firepower demonstration by the US-made Abrams tank which was held in Bahawalpur. The US had offered Abrams tank to Pakistan but performed poorly in evaluations and was not fit for Pakistani operational conditions. Also during the demonstrations, the tank allegedly missed the targets during the demonstration, which was no less than an embarrassment for the US. His death led to political instability in Pakistan and a shift in leadership. The new leadership was less aligned with U.S. strategic objectives, and the political dynamics changed, which impacted the U.S.-Pakistan relationship.

M1A1 Abrams during demonstrations in Pakistan. Source: Reddit

After the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the strategic need for U.S. support to Pakistan significantly diminished. The end of the Soviet-Afghan War marked a shift in U.S. foreign policy priorities, as the immediate threat of Soviet expansion in the region was no longer a pressing concern. The U.S. began to reassess its focus and realign its geopolitical strategies, placing less emphasis on Pakistan and redirecting attention to other regional and global issues.

The biggest shock came when the U.S., under George H.W. Bush administration elected in January 1990, announced to suspension of military aid and imposed sanctions under the “Pressler Amendment” in October same year. Though introduced in 1985 under Reagan’s administration, Pakistan maintained its position as a strategic ally for the US due to its importance against the Soviets. It needed the US President to certify annually that Pakistan is not involved in any nuclear weapon development (based on available intelligence), and is safe for strategic co-operation. It was imposed when evidence emerged of Pakistan's nuclear ambitions, as US intelligence suspected China was assisting Pakistan in designing nuclear weapons. The Pressler Amendment had killed all the hopes of Islamabad for continued US support in its desire to acquire more arms and ammunition designed by the West. The AWACS negotiations were halted, and the F-16 airframes pending delivery were also held back. This significantly impacted Pakistan's defence procurement timeline, causing a almost 20-year delay in acquiring AWACS capabilities, which were eventually fulfilled with the induction of SAAB 2000 “Erieye” AEW&CS in 2009, in the deal signed for four such from Sweden in 2006, with each airframe costing US$93 million. Even today, Pakistan is reportedly receiving SAAB aircraft, as the latest unit was inducted in January 2024, bringing the total number to 9, with more suspected to come. Presently, Pakistan’s fleet of AWACS even outnumbers the Indian Air Force that operates 6 systems of the segment.

Pakistan Air Force SAAB 2000 "Erieye". Source: SAAB

Bonus: The myth of Indian AWACS in 1971 war

During the 1971 war, the Indian Air Force (IAF) executed daring low-level night strikes on Pakistani airfields, using MiG-21 and Su-7 aircraft from the Combat Air Development Unit (CADU), which has evolved into TACDE today. These missions were particularly challenging due to the lack of navigation aids, blackout conditions, and extremely low fuel levels that left no margin for error. To ensure the safe return of their pilots, the IAF developed an innovative solution known as the "Sparrow" mission. These involved positioning a high-altitude fighter, generally a MiG-21 Type 77 (from No.1 “Tigers” squadron based at Adampur) referred to as "Sparrow," to relay navigation and recovery information to the returning strike aircraft, helping them safely locate and land at friendly bases, despite the absence of reliable communication or radar detection.

The "Sparrow" concept was simple yet highly effective. The high-altitude fighters, flown by skilled pilots, would stay aloft at endurance speed, well away from enemy interception but close enough to relay vital information. These missions were crucial in guiding the strike aircraft back to bases like Amritsar, Halwara, or Adampur, often at the very edge of their fuel range. Despite the inherent risks and the rudimentary technology at hand, this method allowed the IAF to conduct successful night operations with minimal losses, showcasing the resourcefulness and adaptability of the pilots and ground controllers.

In the aftermath of the war, Pakistan, surprised by the effectiveness of the IAF's night strikes, speculated that these operations were supported by sophisticated Soviet AWACS aircraft, specifically the "Moss" AEW planes, based on Tu-126. This assumption underestimated the ingenuity of the IAF, which had relied on its resources and innovative tactics rather than external assistance. The success of the approximately 30 "Sparrow" missions, achieved with minimal technological support, stood in stark contrast to the Pakistani claims, highlighting the IAF's ability to outmaneuver and out-think its adversary using homegrown solutions.

Tupolev Tu-126 "Moss"


 Footnotes:

https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1986-10-17-mn-5576-story.html 

https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://capsindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/CAPS_Infocus_RS_21.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwjw-c2F_ayIAxXWzjgGHQCKG1YQFnoECBYQAQ&usg=AOvVaw1Ry3jHBm2b3YVhXtwX45lF

https://prod-appfeeds.intoday.in/magazine/international/story/19870531-pak-scales-down-its-quest-to-the-twin-engined-hawkeye-instead-of-the-e-3a-sentry-awacs-798876-1987-05-30

 

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